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Knowledge-Hub
Notes from the IR Desk
In my previous post, Has Venture Capital Mistaken Speed for Progress?, I argued that AI should compress friction, not judgment.
Since then, I have kept returning to the same issue from the LP side.
AI now appears in almost every venture conversation. Managers describe AI-native portfolios, AI-enabled investment processes and access to the companies building the next generation of infrastructure and applications.
For LPs, the question is no longer whether they have exposure to AI. Most already do.
The more useful question is what that exposure actually represents.
Does it provide access to companies an LP would not otherwise own? Does the manager’s specialization lead to better selection and disciplined pricing? Does its network help turn technical promise into an enterprise product? And can that advantage eventually produce distributions?
These questions reveal much more than the number of AI companies in a portfolio.
Exposure Is Not an Investment Strategy
Demand for AI exposure is not in doubt. S&P Global reported that more than 75% of LPs planned to deploy capital into AI over the following 12 months. At the same time, 82% of the increase in AI investment during 2025 went into rounds of at least $1 billion. Capital is entering the sector quickly, but much of it is concentrating around a relatively small number of companies.
A portfolio may contain several managers with different names, geographies and strategies while still carrying exposure to many of the same companies or parts of the AI stack.
So the first question an LP should ask is not simply, “How much AI exposure does this fund have?”
It is: What exposure do we already own, and what will this manager add that is genuinely different?
The answer may lie in stage, geography, technical domain or access to companies before they become widely competed assets. It may also lie in the ability to identify an important category before the market has agreed on its name.
Without that differentiation, adding another AI-focused fund can increase concentration while creating the appearance of diversification.
Does Specialization Change What the Manager Sees?
Sector expertise is often described through credentials: years in the industry, technical backgrounds, investment history or the size of an advisory network.
Those things matter, but LPs should look for evidence that they change the opportunity set.
Does the manager consistently meet relevant founders before a formal fundraising process begins? Do experienced operators refer founders because they trust the firm’s understanding of the market? Can the team recognize a problem that appears narrow today but could become a substantial category?
This is particularly important in cybersecurity, where AI and security are rapidly becoming one investment conversation.
AI is changing how software is created, how attacks are launched and how security teams operate. Agentic systems introduce new questions about identity, permissions, visibility and accountability. Products are forming around problems many enterprises are still learning how to define.
In that environment, early access is not just a matter of receiving a deck first. It comes from being close enough to CISOs, technical leaders and founders to see where existing tools are failing before the problem becomes a recognized category.
Recent Glilot conversations have focused heavily on this convergence. At Black Hat, founders, CISOs and technology leaders were increasingly addressing AI and cybersecurity as parts of the same problem.
The value of those relationships is not the event itself. It is the information produced by repeated, candid conversations with the people implementing these systems inside real organizations.
That is what LPs should test: not whether a network exists, but whether it improves what the manager sees and when it sees it.
Does Domain Expertise Improve Selection?
Access matters only if the manager knows what to select.
AI has made it easier to build a convincing demonstration. Software development is faster and testing an idea costs less. Those are meaningful advances, but they also make surface-level signals less useful.
A polished product can still lack a durable customer need. Rapid adoption can reflect experimentation rather than dependency. A company can use sophisticated AI without possessing proprietary data, a defensible workflow or a credible route into enterprise budgets.
The same applies in cyber. An emerging threat does not automatically create a viable company. The product still has to fit into a crowded security architecture, survive long procurement processes and earn the confidence of customers who cannot afford careless decisions.
A specialist manager should be able to explain:
- Which assumptions were validated directly with customers
- Why the problem requires a new company rather than a feature from an incumbent
- What becomes more defensible as the company scales
- How the product moves from a pilot to a system on which customers depend
- Which technical or market risks could invalidate the thesis
Building an AI prototype is becoming easier; building a lasting enterprise business is not. Execution, domain knowledge and demonstrated customer value therefore carry more weight, not less.
An LP should expect a specialist to explain not only why an investment was made, but what evidence would have caused the firm to walk away.
A specialist earns confidence by knowing where its conviction ends.
How Does the Thesis Reach Distributions?
A sector thesis can be compelling while still being incomplete.
LPs invest in a fund, not a collection of interesting technological predictions. They need to understand how sourcing, selection, ownership and portfolio support translate into realized value.
That question has become more prominent as liquidity remains constrained. Recent manager-selection discussions have put repeatability and DPI back at the center: between two funds with similar total value, the manager that has returned more capital is easier for an LP to support.
This does not mean rushing companies toward premature exits. My original argument still applies: operational speed should not be confused with the time required to build an enduring business.
But patience must be paired with a credible realization strategy. LPs can reasonably ask how a manager thinks about strategic buyers, follow-on reserves and the point at which holding a company creates more expected value than seeking liquidity.
The question is not, “When will every company exit?”
It is: How does this strategy create credible paths from early insight to returned capital?
What LPs Are Really Underwriting
Dynamo’s 2026 survey found that 63% of LPs planned to increase their alternative allocations, and 78% expected to use fund managers. LPs still value manager expertise, and they also want greater transparency and control over where their capital is going.
LPs are not merely underwriting exposure to a popular sector. They are underwriting a manager’s ability to interpret a fast-moving market before consensus forms, maintain discipline while capital rushes in and help technically strong companies become durable businesses.
For a specialist, domain knowledge should create earlier access, improve selection, make diligence more informed and make portfolio support more relevant.
If specialization cannot be observed in those outcomes, it may be positioning rather than an investment edge.
The View from the IR Desk
IR sits in an important place in this conversation.
We hear the excitement around AI, but also the questions beneath it. LPs want access to the companies shaping the next technology cycle. They also want to understand concentration, valuation, defensibility and the path to liquidity.
Those positions are not in conflict. They reflect the same responsibility: allocating capital to genuine long-term advantage rather than following the language of the moment.
The best question for an LP is therefore not, “Does this manager invest in AI?”
It is:
What does this manager understand, access and improve because of its specialization – and how will that advantage ultimately return capital?
Sector exposure is increasingly easy to find.
A repeatable edge is not.
Israel is a global supplier of AI solutions, yet when it comes to applying them internally, it lags behind. We know what to do, we just don’t have the machinery to do it.
The obstacles are familiar. Ministries take a “territorial” approach to information and are reluctant to share it with one another. The Mandatory Tenders Law imposes procurement timelines that cannot keep pace with AI. And the National Digital Agency lacks the authority to compel ministries to act. Without parallel organizational reform, investment in technology may yield only limited benefit.
The five principles below are not theoretical ideas. Each is based on a proven model that has been tested in one or more countries, and together they set a practical order of priorities for the national AI directorate, established in September 2025 within the Prime Minister’s Office following the Nagel Committee’s recommendations.
1. Build a shared data infrastructure, with clear obligations to participate
The component that every expert points to as a necessary condition for adopting AI in the public sector is a unified data infrastructure that allows secure information exchange between ministries.
Estonia’s X-Road offers a useful model. Rather than creating a single central database, Estonia chose a federated model: each ministry retains ownership of its data while allowing other ministries encrypted access. Launched in 2001, X-Road is relatively inexpensive to implement and has been found to save the Estonian public sector thousands of working hours a year. It now supports more than 3,000 public services in Estonia alone and has been adopted by more than twenty countries.
For citizens, the practical significance is straightforward. An Estonian citizen applying for a benefit does not need to collect documents from other ministries: the system brings the data together and makes it available.
Israel does not need to reinvent the wheel. In 2019 it established a comparable infrastructure, the Government Information Highway. Yet a November 2024 State Comptroller report found that only 9% of government services had actually been connected to it. The Comptroller stated explicitly that the root of the failure is not technological but institutional: the National Digital Agency has no authority to compel ministries to connect, and they have not done so.
The required work therefore has both a technical and an institutional dimension. A dedicated data-cleaning team within the national directorate should map existing datasets, identify problems, remove duplication and establish common structures. The most critical component, however, is primary legislation that obligates the ministries that hold information “territorially”, such as Health, the National Insurance Institute and the Tax Authority, to share it, balanced against the Privacy Protection Law, and backs that obligation with an enforcement mechanism.
Without a binding obligation to share, the failure of the Information Highway will simply repeat itself in the age of AI.
2. Adapt procurement to the pace of AI development
Under the Mandatory Tenders Law, a typical government tender takes eight to eighteen months, and that is only the first stage of a long procurement process. This is a structural barrier: by the time a tender for a language model is completed and a contract signed, the model on offer will be obsolete.
The solution starts with amending the Mandatory Tenders Law to allow open framework agreements. Any supplier that meets basic criteria, including information security, financial stability and proven experience, would join a pool of approved suppliers within a few weeks, without a separate tender for each order. Ministries could then buy from the pool through a short “mini-tender” lasting only weeks. This model has been widely adopted in the British and American public sectors: Britain’s G-Cloud framework has registered more than 5,000 suppliers since 2012.
Usage-based purchasing would complement this approach. Instead of committing in advance to an annual usage ceiling, a ministry would pay according to actual consumption, such as the number of data-sharing requests, data volume or computing hours. This suits the early stages of adoption, when the scale of use is not known in advance.
Alongside these purchasing routes, Israel needs regulatory sandboxes. These are controlled environments in which the state allows companies to test a new technology for a limited period under close supervision. They let both companies and regulators experiment with the technology, which can lead to lighter and more effective regulation. Israel has already started down this path: in 2025 the Innovation Authority and the Ministry of Education opened a NIS 10 million sandbox for personalized learning, and in 2026 the Ministry of Health followed with one for medical AI. The next step is to extend the model to the National Insurance Institute, local authorities and the Tax Authority.
3. Give public employees consistent access to secure AI tools
Singapore offers the model: building an organizational infrastructure that allows public servants themselves to lead AI adoption in their work. Its government technology agency, GovTech, developed and distributed three main tools across the public service: Pair, a general AI assistant for writing, summarizing, translation, document processing and research; SmartCompose, a writing tool; and AIBots, a platform for building chatbots. By the second quarter of 2025, Pair had some 64,000 monthly active users, about 42% of Singapore’s civil service.
Britain completes the picture. In February 2025 it published an AI Playbook, a detailed technical document that sets out rules for the safe and effective use of AI by public sector employees. A trial among 20,000 British civil servants found that each saved close to two working weeks a year.
Information security is a precondition. Three common computing architectures balance AI capabilities with data protection and should become standard in Israel’s public sector: open-source models, such as Llama or Mistral, running directly on closed government servers; a private government cloud, in which data is stored and processed only within a defined jurisdiction and is not used to train generic models; and public cloud computing, with encryption and masking applied before data is transferred.
Israel can choose between three routes: mass licensing of tools from companies such as Microsoft and Google; developing an Israeli model with the private sector, as the Nagel Committee recommended; or combining international systems with an Israeli adaptation layer. The decision depends on cost and information security requirements.
4. Make training and measurement part of management
Classic management literature points to the need for structured, quantitative targets. Without them, even excellent recommendations remain declarations.
Each ministry should have measurable training targets. For example: 15% of employees trained in the first quarter, 30% by the end of the first year and 70% by the end of the second. Each ministry’s progress should be published on the Civil Service Commission’s website as part of its existing Digital Index. Basic AI literacy should include an understanding of models’ capabilities and limitations, practical instruction in formulating requests, methods for identifying errors and information security requirements.
Each division should also have an “AI champion”, similar to the safety and privacy officers ministries already have. This employee, not necessarily a technologist, would help colleagues formulate prompts, identify tasks suited to AI and find the relevant tools. Champions would receive 40 to 60 hours of in-depth training a year and form a cross-ministry knowledge network. Similar models operate in Singapore and Britain, and the network could be strengthened by a regular forum modeled on Singapore’s AI Wednesdays.
Gradually, basic AI literacy should also become a requirement in internal tenders for managerial and senior professional roles. This would turn training from a voluntary bonus into part of the standard career path, and signal to employees that investing in learning pays off. Careful implementation is needed to avoid excluding experienced employees with extensive professional knowledge.
Finally, ministries should measure actual use. Monitoring systems for AI tools can track the share of active users, frequency of use and types of use, and this information should be part of the management data delivered to each ministry’s head and to the national directorate. The British experience is instructive: the active usage rate was about 72%, and employees who built the tool into their daily work saved three times as much time as those who used it occasionally. The purpose of measurement is not coercive supervision, but to help build an organizational culture in which learning AI is a standard part of public sector work.
5. Make oversight concrete and preserve access to human review
The “human in the loop” principle, and the need to guard against algorithmic biases, including political ones, require a concrete oversight framework. The Ministry of Innovation, Science and Technology’s 2023 policy document already embraces these principles, listing human involvement, with ongoing oversight and the right to appeal to a person, alongside transparency, explainability and accountability. Three tools, each already proven abroad, can put this framework into practice.
The first is an algorithmic impact assessment before deployment, such as the one adopted in Canada. The Canadian directive requires every federal department to conduct a structured assessment before deploying an automated system for administrative decisions. The assessment classifies the system into one of four risk levels, each with its own requirements for oversight, transparency and appeal. The Canadian tool consists of 106 questions that translate into a numerical score, and it is open to public scrutiny.
The second is a public model card: a document of one to three pages accompanying every government AI system. It describes the model and its version, the data it was trained on, its intended uses and uses that are not recommended, expected error rates for different population groups, and who is responsible for inquiries. The concept was proposed by Google researchers in 2019 and has since been adopted by many companies and public bodies.
The third is a right to human review. Any citizen affected by a decision made by a government AI system should be entitled to have it examined by an official who is not bound by the system’s outcome. This right is anchored in Article 22 of the GDPR and reinforced by the EU AI Act, and it is the practical translation of the human-in-the-loop principle into a civil right.
In Israel, all three could be anchored in legislation or in an amendment to Government Resolution 3375. Far from slowing adoption, they would enable it by building the public trust without which any broad initiative will meet resistance, and they would give ministries a clear framework in place of the legal uncertainty that holds initiatives back.
Unlocking Israeli innovation
This is where the gap is sharpest: there is no clear route for an Israeli startup to become a supplier to a government ministry. Israel already has some of the pieces, including pilot programs and regulatory sandboxes, but they lack coordination, move too slowly for startups and offer no clear path from pilot to procurement.
Three international models show how to close this gap. The American SBIR program funds companies in stages, from feasibility through prototype, to a final stage in which the federal agency itself becomes a customer of the technology; a large percentage of DARPA’s tenders go to companies that came through it. G-Commerce, an American platform built on Glass’s system and launched in 2026, lets public bodies buy AI tools through contracts that have already been reviewed and approved in a joint tender, instead of each body running its own. And Singapore’s AI Trailblazers program, run with Google, has supported 84 organizations since its launch, each of which builds a prototype in roughly 100 days.
Building on these models, the national AI directorate can run a four-stage bridge between Israeli startups and the public service. First, needs: together with the main ministries, the directorate publishes an annual list of specific organizational needs, framed as open descriptions of the problem rather than closed tender specifications. Second, a sandbox: startups propose solutions, and the directorate approves five to ten companies for a six-to-twelve-month pilot in a sandbox covering privacy, information security and legal liability, with an initial allocation of NIS 1 to 3 million per company. Third, evaluation: an independent body measures each pilot against predefined criteria, such as productivity gains, cost savings and service quality; results are published, and the best-performing companies are selected to provide the services. Fourth, export: companies that have gained experience in Israel’s public service receive government support to export their solutions, creating both more efficient services in Israel and technology exports that grow Israeli high-tech.
There will be obstacles. The Mandatory Tenders Law makes it difficult to choose a specific supplier, even after a successful pilot; the solution is a legal amendment allowing direct procurement for AI initiatives that have completed a successful pilot, as the United States does through Other Transaction Authority. Israel’s strict privacy law limits the transfer of citizens’ data to external companies; as the Nagel Committee recommended, the law should be adapted to allow regulated use within a sandbox. This does not mean abolishing privacy protection, but creating a legal framework for supervised experiments. Public-sector wage and collective agreements may limit the ability to change work processes, which requires a firm stance that puts the public interest first. And each ministry will prefer its own pilots over a coordinated framework; the answer is clear political ownership of the national directorate by the prime minister, with a public commitment to measurable results.
From technological capability to public benefit
The five principles form a deliberate sequence. Shared data is the precondition for everything else. Agile procurement and sandboxes provide the legal infrastructure for effective action. Unified AI tools bring the technology into daily work. Training and measurement ensure that adoption does not remain with individuals but becomes a cross-government capability. Oversight ensures that public trust is not harmed along the way.
International comparison does not offer a single model to copy, but different elements from which Israel can draw. Israel operates in unique circumstances: a large public sector with strong unions, a fragile political structure and a leading AI industry whose achievements have not yet been translated into domestic applications. Moving from declarations to practice will require patience, political continuity and primary legislation that anchors the basic principles of government use of AI.
The AI revolution is not only technological. It is also a managerial and organizational revolution, and its successful adoption depends on redesigning organizational structures, overcoming territoriality between ministries and maintaining transparency toward citizens. Investment in technology is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one. The most telling measure of the national directorate will not be how many billions are allocated to infrastructure, but how many Israeli startups manage to cross the bridge from the lab into the public service within its first two years.
1. Frequently Asked Questions:
What are the five principles for bringing AI into Israel’s public sector?
The five principles form a deliberate sequence. Shared data is the precondition for everything else. Agile procurement and sandboxes provide the legal infrastructure for effective action. Unified AI tools bring the technology into daily work. Training and measurement ensure that adoption does not remain with individuals but becomes a cross-government capability. Oversight ensures that public trust is not harmed along the way.
Why does Israel lag behind in using AI inside government?
The obstacles are familiar. Ministries take a “territorial” approach to information and are reluctant to share it with one another. The Mandatory Tenders Law imposes procurement timelines that cannot keep pace with AI. And the National Digital Agency lacks the authority to compel ministries to act.
What is Estonia’s X-Road?
Rather than creating a single central database, Estonia chose a federated model: each ministry retains ownership of its data while allowing other ministries encrypted access.
Why has Israel’s Government Information Highway fallen short?
The Comptroller stated explicitly that the root of the failure is not technological but institutional: the National Digital Agency has no authority to compel ministries to connect, and they have not done so.
How can government procurement keep pace with AI?
The solution starts with amending the Mandatory Tenders Law to allow open framework agreements. Any supplier that meets basic criteria, including information security, financial stability and proven experience, would join a pool of approved suppliers within a few weeks, without a separate tender for each order. Ministries could then buy from the pool through a short “mini-tender” lasting only weeks.
What is a regulatory sandbox?
These are controlled environments in which the state allows companies to test a new technology for a limited period under close supervision. They let both companies and regulators experiment with the technology, which can lead to lighter and more effective regulation.
What is an algorithmic impact assessment?
The Canadian directive requires every federal department to conduct a structured assessment before deploying an automated system for administrative decisions. The assessment classifies the system into one of four risk levels, each with its own requirements for oversight, transparency, and appeal.
What is a public model card?
The second is a public model card: a document of one to three pages accompanying every government AI system. It describes the model and its version, the data it was trained on, its intended uses and uses that are not recommended, expected error rates for different population groups, and who is responsible for inquiries.
How could Israeli startups become suppliers to government ministries?
Building on these models, the national AI directorate can run a four-stage bridge between Israeli startups and the public service.
Israeli startups raised $7.6 billion in the first half of 2026. It is an impressive figure, especially alongside a year of major technology exits. But it does not describe the fundraising experience of every founder. In the same period, first investments accounted for only 35.5% of VC and corporate VC investment actions, the lowest share in a decade. More capital is moving through the market, while a smaller share of investors’ decisions is going to companies they have not backed before.[1]
For a founder raising a first institutional round, that is the tension to understand. A large funding total can make the market look open. In practice, much of the capital is going to established companies or existing portfolios. The useful question is not simply whether investors have money. It is what will give them the confidence to make a new bet.
A strong year with a narrower entrance
The distribution of funding makes the contrast clearer. In the second quarter of 2026, Series B and later rounds received 83% of the capital raised, while funding from pre-seed through Series A fell to $741 million, down from an average of $1.3 billion in the preceding three quarters. The median seed or Series A round nevertheless rose to $14 million in the first half of the year.[1]
These figures describe a selective market, not a closed one. Some young companies are raising meaningful rounds, but aggregate funding says little about how readily the next new company can secure its first check. They also describe one quarter and one half-year; founders should not mistake a short stretch of large late-stage deals for a permanent rule about every funding stage.
There are encouraging signs beyond the headlines. In the 2024 cohort tracked by IVC, the share progressing from seed to Series A rose to 14%, compared with 8% for the 2023 cohort. That is still below the historical 17% baseline, and the 2024 cohort’s data is not yet final. Even so, it suggests that the path from an early round to the next one is improving.[1]
The implication for founders is straightforward: think beyond getting a meeting or closing the current round. What will your company learn and demonstrate with the capital, and what will a customer have to believe before adopting the product?
The evidence that changes a fundraising conversation
An ambitious technical idea can earn attention. Evidence that a buyer has a pressing problem can change the conversation. This is particularly true in cybersecurity, where a product may work brilliantly in a demonstration yet face a very different test inside a large organization. A security leader has to decide whether the problem merits a new budget, whether the product fits existing workflows, and whether the team can be trusted with a critical function.
Founders can start testing those questions before the product is fully built. Speak with the person who lives with the problem, the person who owns the budget, and the team that would have to put a solution in place. They may all describe the same challenge differently. Those differences can expose a buying obstacle early enough to address it.
A useful customer conversation goes further than “Would you use this?” Ask how the organization handles the problem today. What happens if nothing changes? Who would approve a purchase? What proof would they need from a pilot? Which existing tool or process would your product replace? If people are interested but no one owns the decision, that is a signal too.
The aim is not to collect a stack of enthusiastic quotes. It is to learn whether the problem is urgent, whether the proposed solution fits the way customers actually work, and what evidence would move them from interest to a decision. A founder who can explain those answers has a more useful story for investors, and a better basis for deciding what to build next.
Why this matters in cybersecurity and AI
Cybersecurity and enterprise software received roughly equal shares of Israeli venture funding in the first half of 2026: 33.7% and 33.6%, respectively, under IVC’s sector categories. AI runs through many of these products rather than sitting neatly alongside them as a separate market.[1] A founder may describe a company as “AI security,” but the label cannot answer who will buy it or why.
Consider a team building an AI tool for security operations. Its first hypothesis might be that analysts need faster investigations. Conversations with analysts could confirm that, while conversations with security leaders reveal a different requirement: they need to know which actions an agent may take without approval and how its work can be reviewed. That discovery would change the product, the pilot, and the way the company explains its value. This is an illustrative example, not a claim about a particular company.
The same discipline applies across enterprise technology. Founders need to find the point where technical capability meets a problem someone is responsible for solving. Customer access matters most when it produces honest answers, including answers that challenge the original pitch.
What an investor can contribute after the first check
In this market, founders should ask prospective investors more than how much they can invest. Do they understand the buyer and the path to a purchasing decision? Can they bring the company into substantive conversations with relevant operators? Will they help interpret difficult feedback rather than simply provide introductions? What support and follow-on capacity can they offer as the company grows?
This is how we think about our role at Glilot Capital. We invest in cybersecurity, AI and enterprise software from seed through early growth. Through our network of CISOs and enterprise leaders and the Mach5 value creation program, portfolio founders can test assumptions about the problem, product, differentiation and buying process with people who know the market firsthand. Our value creation work continues across customer access, go-to-market and growth.[2][3]
We also create opportunities for founders to meet and learn: events that connect them with CISOs, enterprise leaders and investors, webinars that offer practical insights, and founder gatherings where they can share lessons with one another.
None of those conversations guarantees product-market fit. Their value is that they can reveal what is working, what is missing and what needs to change while founders still have room to act. Capital gives a company time to build. The right market signals help it use that time well.
What founders should take into the next round
Israel’s funding totals show the scale of the opportunity. The smaller share of first investments shows why founders need to make a clear case for a new company in that market. The most persuasive case starts with a specific problem, a buyer who feels its cost, and evidence of what it would take to win that buyer’s trust.
Before the next investor meeting, founders should be able to describe what they have heard from potential customers, where the answers conflict, and how those conversations have changed the product. That is useful even when the response is uncomfortable. It replaces a broad claim about market demand with a set of decisions grounded in the market itself.
The funding environment will keep changing. The work of finding a real problem, learning from the people who own it, and building something they will adopt remains a strong place to start.
Frequently asked questions
Is it harder to raise venture capital in Israel in 2026
For a new company, the data points to a more selective market. First investments made up 35.5% of VC and corporate VC investment actions in H1 2026, down from 43.1% in 2025. That measures the share of investment actions, not the share of funding dollars.[1]
What should an early stage founder demonstrate to investors
A clear customer problem, evidence that the problem matters to a buyer, and an honest account of what customer conversations have taught the team. The relevant proof will vary by company and stage; early research, pilot results, usage and purchasing commitments carry different weight.
How does Glilot Capital help founders test product market fit
Mach5 connects portfolio founders with experienced advisors and potential customers for structured feedback on their product-market-fit assumptions, differentiation and pricing. Glilot Capital also supports customer access and go-to-market work as companies grow.[2][3]
Building something new?
We want to hear about it. Reach out to us.
Sources
[1] IVC Research Center and LeumiTech, Israeli Tech Review Q2 2026 and H1 2026
Knowledge-Hub
The catalyst for this initiative was a persistent operational challenge: critical institutional knowledge was fragmented across disparate systems, including the firm’s relationship management platform and internal chat tools. This fragmentation created significant data quality issues and a systemic vulnerability. The risk of knowledge loss became particularly acute with the announcement of an upcoming team member’s departure, which underscored how vital insights could vanish if not centrally managed.
While human relationships remain the heartbeat of venture capital, the industry relies heavily on vast datasets. Critical information from pitch decks and legal documents to meeting notes and market trends is often siloed across multiple systems. At Glilot Capital, we aimed to unify this fragmented data into a single, actionable intelligence engine. This vision came to life as GlilotOS.
GlilotOS: Our Digital Infrastructure
GlilotOS is a proprietary platform designed to integrate all operational workflows and data points into a centralized intelligence hub. This infrastructure allows our team to seamlessly navigate market trends, deal flow, and portfolio performance through one interface. By consolidating these streams, GlilotOS provides the essential framework for our investment professionals to serve as high-level strategic partners.
Functioning as our firm’s digital core, GlilotOS utilizes specialized AI agents to unlock the full potential of our institutional memory.
Eliot: Purpose-Built Intelligence
More than a simple AI integration, Eliot is a specialized intelligence layer constructed on top of GlilotOS specifically for the venture capital sector. While the Glilot Capital team actively leverages leading AI platforms such as ChatGPT, Gemini, Perplexity, and Claude across various workflows, our primary focus for agent development and deployment is Eliot. We view these external AI platforms as powerful productivity tools, while Eliot serves as our proprietary AI operating layer, purpose-built around the unique needs of venture capital investing and portfolio management. Eliot functions as a proprietary “super-agent,” connecting to all company data sources from our relationship management system and File Sharing systems and internal tools to internal chat platforms to provide a holistic view of our operations. Currently in its beta phase, Eliot focuses on read-only queries to ensure maximum stability and accuracy before we introduce future generative capabilities, such as automated email drafting.
The power of this integration is already being felt in daily operations. In one recent instance, Eliot was able to instantly cross-reference a list of eleven portfolio companies to identify which had recently appointed a CFO or VP of Finance, a task that would have otherwise required extensive manual searching. Deeply integrated into our architecture, it enables real-time reasoning and synthesis for complex tasks, providing outputs tailored to the rigorous standards of the VC landscape.
Transforming Operations
Eliot has revolutionized our workflow by eliminating manual searches across platforms. Tasks that previously required hours of preparation are now completed instantly:
- Strategic Meeting Prep: By aggregating institutional data on companies and founders, Eliot identifies crucial topics and past touchpoints for upcoming discussions.
- Dynamic Diligence: The agent correlates external market signals with internal research to provide a comprehensive analysis of new investment opportunities.
- Active Portfolio Oversight: Eliot tracks operational changes within portfolio companies, flagging issues that need immediate intervention.
- Enhanced LP Engagement: It streamlines investor relations by managing updates and providing instant access to historical communication.
- Conversational Memory: Years of internal memos and insights are transformed into a searchable, interactive knowledge base.
Looking Ahead
As specialists in AI and cybersecurity investments, we believe it is essential to lead by example. Glilot Capital is the first VC firm to deploy a fully integrated AI agent across all operations. Eliot is now a fundamental part of our culture, defining the next generation of AI-native venture capital.











